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THIRTEEN EASY PIECES
Frank I Michelman*
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Edited by Sanford Levinson.

Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1995. Pp. ix, 330. Cloth,
$59.50; paper, $18.95.
I.

PROLOGUE:

ARE WE

ALL PosrrmvisTs Now?

Responding to Imperfection1 is a collection of essays on the ways
of constitutional change in the United States. 2 Correlatively, the
book is a collection of views on the figurations of "higher law" in
American constitutional thought and argument. "Collection," however, does not do the volume justice, because it mounts a conversation whose sum exceeds its parts. Beyond the merits of any of the
selections standing alone, an intriguing interplay among them gives
this book a special energy and interest. What follow are some
thoughts about that interplay. Reflections of one reader's interests
of the moment, these thoughts should not be mistaken for a full
account of all that is worth attention in these essays.
Theoretical legal positivism has an official standard-bearer on
Levinson's stage: he is Frederick Schauer. Schauer suggests positivist opinion is unfashionable, 3 but I wonder. As far as I can see, if
there is anything most of your standard-issue, fin de sidcle American constitutionalists would rather not profess, 4 it is natural law,
legal positivism's supposed opposite. Rarely do we claim to be
* Robert Wahnsley University Professor, Harvard. B.A. 1957, Yale; LL.B. 1960,
Harvard. - Ed. For helpful comments, I am especially indebted to James E. Fleming and to
students in my recent Advanced Constitutional Law class at Fordham University Law School.
1. Hereinafter, I will refer to the book as IWEREMIcnON.
2. Three of the contributions comparatively consider arrangements and practices in nonU.S. jurisdictions. See Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional
Revision in EasternEurope, in hNERFCnoN 275; Donald S.Lutz, Toward a Theory of ConstitutionalAmendmen4 in IWPRFEcrioN 237; Noam J. Zohar, Midrash. Amendment through
the Molding of Meaning, in IimP
-crnoN 307.
3. See Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositionsof a Constitution, in IiwER cTION 145, 148 n.8 ("plead[ing] guilty" of having "legal positivist dispositions") [hereinafter
Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions];Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25
CoN. L. Rnv. 797, 798 (1993) (offering to defend positivism against condemnation, "until
recently," as "simultaneously irrelevant and pernicious"); id. at 805 (describing the prevalent
"current attitude among American constitutionalists" as "compatible with ... a natural law
outlook" but "mak[ing) no causal claim").
4. Save a few hardies such as Michael Moore, Robert George, and Hadley Arkes. See,
e.g., Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 Mtc. L. REv. 2424 (1992); ROBERT P.
GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAl. CIvIL LERTEs Am PUBLIC MORAuTY (1993); HADnEY
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drawing our standards for the identification of valid law from speculative sources -rationality, morality, fundaments of the human
condition - lying fully beyond those supplied by socially created
authorities-in-fact. Rarely do we draw them, in other words, strictly
and unambiguously, from what theorists sometimes call transcendent, rather than immanent, sources.5 Justice Hugo Black's excoriation of the "natural-law due process formula ' 6 still carries a sting,
and it is pretty much the case, I believe, that we are all to some
degree positivists now, all immanentists, at least by outward
profession.
Inductive support appears in Imperfection. The book ostensibly
focuses on two questions about the American higher law's amenability to change, both of them centering on Article V of the U.S.
Constitution.7 One question is whether Article V is "exclusive" whether the several paths to amendment the Article marks out are
the only ones by which Americans can arrive at a valid - or rightful, or legally cognizable - change in the higher law. 8 The other
question is whether Article V is boundlessly inclusive - whether,
so to speak, everything goes under Article V or whether, to the
contrary, there are changes that cannot validly be accomplished, in
that way or any other.9
ARKFS, THE RErNtn

OF GEORGE SuTmERLAND: REsTOIUNG A JURISPRUDENCE OF NATU.

PAL RIGH-s at xii, 283 (1994).

5. In Levinson's volume, the immanent-transcendent distinction appears in Mark E.
Brandon, The "Original" Thirteenth Amendment and the Limits to Formal Constitutional
Change,in IMPERFECTION 215,220 (drawing these terms from William F. Harris II, Bonding
Word and Polity: The Logic of American Constitutionalism, 76 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 34
(1982)). See infra note 9.
6. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
7. U.S. CONST. art. V provides:
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the Legislatures of
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to
the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and
fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
8. If we combine the two ways of proposing an amendment (concurrence of two-thirds
majorities of both congressional houses and vote of a convention called on application of
two-thirds of the states) with the two modes of ratification (by legislatures or conventions in
three-fourths of the states), there are altogether (disregarding the range of possible variations
in the "convention" alternatives) four paths to constitutional alteration provided by Article
V.
9. William F. Harris II, a scholar whose work Levinson calls "essential reading" for the
theory of constitutional amendment but who has no essay in the volume, believes that some
relatively profound constitutional changes are achievable by certain Article V routes - the
ones that come closest to approximating the procedure limned by Article VII for adoption of
Article V itself -

but not others. See Acknowledgements in Ir

FEn'EuMcnoN;
WmILAM F.
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One might think these questions would be tools for prying apart
the naturalists and the positivists among us. Contentions that the
Constitution is amendable by popular, or popularly representative,
political action "outside of" the mainly government-driven channels set by Article V10 must mean to appeal, one might suppose,
over the head of the Constitution as we find it to transcendent values of democracy, popular sovereignty, and collective political selfrule. Just as, one might think the idea, for example, of the legal
invalidity of a procedurally immaculate Article V repeal of the First
Amendment 1 ' must mean to appeal beyond the extant regime to
transcendent values of human dignity or freedom.
Thus transpositivistically is not how the players in Impresario
Levinson's antiformalist contingent (as we may style them) present
themselves on stage. 12 With only one arguable exception, they
come on as interpreters of the regime-in-force. They offer us readings of the factually-established American way with politics. In
form, at least, their speeches are not oracles of transcendent reason
or truth, but rather renderings of a historically specific - American
legal-cultural object. None of the principal players asserts or
evidently believes that it is possible or desirable for renditions of
such contestable objects to be wholly uninflected by the renderers'
own perceptions of reason 'and truth. The point, though, is that
when it comes to propounding validity criteria for law in the United
States, it is not theories but facts - facts of extant legal-cultural
practice, interpretable facts but facts nevertheless - that remain
finally sovereign for all our speakers. 13
HARsus II, TiH I~rrnm'P"rABLE CoNsTrrUTON 197-201 (1993), discussed and quoted in
Brandon, supra note 5, at 226-27. For the text of Article VII, see infra note 28.
10. See Bruce Ackerman, HigherLawmaking, in IMPEPFEcrIoN 63; Akhil Reed Amar,
PopularSovereignty and ConstitutionalAmendment, in ImPmE-criON 89. Because the gatekeepers for all the paths are either incumbent members of Congress or incumbent members
of state legislatures, and because Congress can in all cases designate state legislatures as the
ratifiers, see U.S. CONsT. art. V, the Article V scheme as a whole can fairly be called one for
government-driven constitutional change. See Amar, supra, at 90. In Amar's view, although
not in Ackerman's, this government-driven characteristic is a part of the argument for a
nonexclusivist reading of Article V. See infra note 34 (Amar); infra text accompanying notes
38-40 (Ackerman).
11. Compare So-rnos A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONsrrTITTON MEANS (1984), discussed in Brandon, supra note 5, at 222-25 and Amar, supra note 10, at 91-92 and Walter F.
Murphy, Merlin's Memory: The Pastand Future Imperfect of the Once and Future Polity, in
ImPERFEcnoN 163 with HARRMS, supranote 9, discussed in Brandon, supra note 5, at 226-28.
12. Antiformalism is compatible with immanentism. See infra text accompanying notes
29-35.
13. The textual backing for this claim is as follows:
Ackerman describes his arguments in support of a nonexclusivist reading of Article V as
"[c]ombining history with philosophy." Ackerman, supra note 10, at 65. Inquiring into
"[t]he [m]eaning of Article V" (with special respect to the question of its exclusivity), an
inquiry that Ackerman says requires "thoughtful resolution of... textual indeterminacies"
and, he implies, cannot be conducted independently of how we "modern" Americans
"should" read the Article, he invokes "the full range of interpretive disciplines - from the
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MAPPING THE TERRAIN OF DEBATE

A.

Constitutionalism

Among the countless variety of legal-ordering practices that
might prevail in a country, some - but not all - are of the kind we
call constitutionalist. A practice is constitutionalist, to begin with,
only if it hierarchically distinguishes at least two ranks of law: a
or "higher" law and a subordinate
superordinate constitutional
"ordinary" law. 14 The higher law sets conditions of validity for orintention of the Framers to the decisions of the modem Supreme Court." Id.at 71-72. In an
essay published elsewhere, Ackerman is resolute about the immanentist character of constitutional argument. See Bruce Ackerman, Rooted Cosmopolitanism, 104 Emcs 516,518-20;
532-33 (1994).
Amar, Levinson's other frankly prescriptive Article V anti-exclusivist (leaving for later
discussion the more descriptive-minded contributions of Levinson himself and Stephen M.
Griffin) pursues his inquiry into Article V's meaning beyond the "[a]rticle... narrowly construed" to "other provisions of the Constitution... the overall structure and popular sovereignty spirit of the document ...

the history of its creation and amendment, and ...

the

history of the creation and amendment of analogous legal documents, such as state constitutions." Amar, supra note 10, at 91-92.
A like pattern appears with Levinson's substantive-limits advocates. Walter Murphy refers the question of legal limits on "constitutional change" to "the existing system's fundamental normative principles," including those he takes to be fairly derivable from the
system's evident commitment to constitutionalism itself. See Murphy, supranote 11, at 17273, 179-80. In a previous major statement on this topic, Murphy wrote of "retroducing"
limits on constitutional change from the Constitution itself. See Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S.CAr. L. REv. 703, 745 (1980). He would recognize
"prohibitions imposed by natural law, justice, and rights," but only insofar as the "text" actually in force incorporates them by reference. (Murphy notes the possibility, in the absence of
such "textual grounding," of resort to the natural lawyer's claim that what is unjust is ipso
facto not law, he does not, however, endorse it. See Murphy, supranote 11, at 180-81. Mark
Brandon concludes that Murphy could justifiably claim that his theory of amendment limits is
"both immanent and transcendent." See Brandon, supra note 5, at 221. But see id. at 221
n.27 (suspecting that "Murphy's theory of natural rights is [theoretically] prior to the Constitution"). However, the theory's official dress appears to me to be that of immanence.
Brandon also discusses works of William F. Harris II and Sotirios Barber. See id. at 22328. He classifies Harris as an immanentist, presumably because Harris draws his theory of
limits on constitutional change from an interpretation of American constitutional practice as
at 226. (Presumably, then, Branmeant in fact to approximate popular sovereignty. See id.
don would likewise classify his own theory, which is similarly, although not identically,
grounded. See id. at 228-29.) Brandon calls Barber's theory "explicitly transcendental," id.
at 223, and in fact Barber is the one player on Levinson's stage who comes closest to crossing
the rhetorical line from immanence to transcendence. I don't think he has quite crossed it,
however. In Barber's view, constitutional meaning is, in part, a function of "tradition," and
tradition is "a normative theory of what has always been and therefore still is best in us as a
people." BARBER, supra note 11, at 85, quoted in Brandon, supranote 5, at 224 n.38. Correlatively, a change in the Constitution is acceptable so long as "[t]he ways of the Constitution"
continue to "constitute our best current conception of the good society - our best understanding for now." BARBER, supra note 11, at 57,85, quoted in Brandon, supra note 5, at 224.
The tell-tale words are "us," "our," and "now." To my ear, they signify unwillingness to cut
the argument entirely loose from the ground of normative-cultural fact.
14. For a further characteristic of constitutionalist orders, see infra text accompanying
notes 55-56. For consideration of the values served by this "dualism," see infra text accompanying notes 128, 138-39.
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dinary law; it functions as what H.L.A. Hart calls a rule of
recognition.' 5
If that begins, roughly, to. describe what constitutionalism is,
then a constitution is, correlatively, a particular, identifiable assemblage of higher-law prescriptions - be they written, unwritten, or
some combination thereof - subsisting in the practice of a given
country at a given time.16 This constitutional assemblage will certainly contain organizational and procedural prerequisites for valid
ordinary lawmaking. Within it one may also find limits on the allowable contents of ordinary law. We need not debate whether
such "substantive" limits are an essential feature of any constitutionalist system worthy of the name, or, in other words, whether
"constitutionalism" is partly synonymous with "limited government. 1 7 It is enough for our purposes that such limits have come
to be viewed as a part of the essence of American constitutionalism.
A constitution, then, contains procedural, and perhaps substantive,
preconditions for valid ordinary lawmaking. Is anything more required of it for completeness?
B. Amendment Rules
To most of us, it will intuitively seem that a constitution, to be
complete, must prescribe the validity conditions not just for ordinary lawmaking, but also for any further higher lawmaking within
the subsisting system of governance for which the constitution itself
ostensibly supplies the higher law. Why we should think this is a
matter bearing investigation. The answer begins, but does not end,
in what we usually understand by the idea of a country's being in a
legally ordered state. We associate legal ordering with a preponderant sharing by inhabitants of some practical understanding of
who, selected by what means or marks and acting by what forms
and in what combinations, is imbued with authority to declare
15. See H.L.A. HART, Tsm CONCEPT OF LAW 97-114,245-47 (1961); Schauer, Amending
the Presuppositions,supranote 3, at 149-50.
16. See Samuel Freeman, OriginalMeaning, DemocraticInterpretation, and the Constitution, 21 Pim. & PuB. AFF.3, 6 (1992) ("In its institutional sense, the political constitution of
any regime is that system of publicly recognized and commonly accepted rules for making
and applying those social rules that are laws.").
17. Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalismin the United States: From Theory to Politics,in
IMPERFECrON 37,39 &n.10, approvingly quotes CHARLEs HowARD MCILWAiN, CONsTrrUTIONALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN 24 (1940), to the effect that essential to constitutionalism
is the idea of "legal limitation on government," understood as an antithesis of "arbitrary" or
"despotic" rule. To agree is not yet to answer the question whether constitutionalism necessarily entails substantive limits on ordinary lawmaking, because structural and procedural
provisions might be thought the aptest way to constrain government action away from arbitrariness and despotism. See Griffin, supr, at 40 & n.14; infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
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"good" law.' 8 In the theoretical lingo of legal positivism, whatever
indicative content lies within this shared-in-fact understanding is
the country's "ultimate rule of recognition" ("URR"), and positivists will seem to most of us, most days, undoubtedly correct in
their insistence that legal ordering in a country presupposes the
existence of a URR. 19
If so, however, then the positivists are equally persuasive that a
country's URR is not itself a law, but rather is a practice, "a matter
of social fact.., for empirical investigation rather than legal analysis. ' '20 But then why should we think that it is to a country's constitution -

a law or body of law

-

that the population must look for

last-ditch answers to legal-validity questions, so that a constitution
is to be judged defective if it lacks a specification of the validity
conditions for higher lawmaking? Evidently, we think this precisely
because our minds, not surprisingly, are on a country whose URR is
of the constitutionalist kind, and one mark of that kind of URR one mark of the kind of legal-cultural practice that it is - is to refer
all questions about legal authority and validity to a set of rules that
themselves have the status and regulative force of law in inhabitants' eyes, having been conventionalized as such in a certain body
of high law called a constitution. 21 This, too, is a part of what constitutionalism is in our lives."?
18. Legal-positivist accounts make the presence of such a shared understanding an identifying mark of legal ordering. See, e.g., Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions,supra note 3,
at 148-52 (referring to works of Hans Kesen and H.L.A. Hart). Natural-law accounts also
seem to presuppose it insofar as they contend that whoever has effective authority to declare
what counts as good or valid law ought or must sometimes, in fashioning such declarations,
refer to transempirical moral considerations. Se4 e.g., JEFFREE G. MuRPHY & JuLES L.
COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCnION TO JURISPRUDENCE 36-40 (1990).
19. See, eg., Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions,supra note 3, at 150.
20. Id.at 150 (footnote omitted).
21. "Conventionalized" does not necessarily mean reduced to a canonical text to be read
more or less literally or formalistically. See Freeman, supra note 16, at 7.
22. It is true that constitutionalism's having this significance for us makes our constitutionalist URR self-referring or recursive, and so gives rise to paradox at the outer bounds of
constitutionalist reflection. See infra note 27 for an illustration. For speculation on why constitutionalism nevertheless entails referring questions about legal authority to a higher law,
see infra text accompanying notes 128-31.
Frederick Schauer's contribution to Levinson's volume argues that changes in the meanings of constitutional prescriptions can be wrought by changes in the factual, political-cultural
background of "assumed presuppositions," as well as by official acts of legislation and legal
interpretation. Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions,supra note 3, at 160-61. There is no
conflict between that view and my claim here that it is partially definitive of a constitutionalist
political-cultural background that inhabitants treat the validity conditions for higher lawmaking as themselves a matter to be found out by legal investigation. See Laurence Tribe, Taking
Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 108 HARV. L. Rnv. 1221, 1291 n.227 ("My view of Article V as providing the only
methods of amendment that meet the Constitution's own requirements is consistent with
Professor Schauer's point.").
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Let us speak, then, of amendment rules, and let us agree on a
broad understanding of both of that locution's component terms.
"Amendment" means alteration of the higher law, of whatever ex3 "Rule" means any interpretable prescription, any
tent or degree23
prescription extractable from a given and finite corpus juris, such as
Americans take the Constitution to be. The class of amendment
rules has limiting cases. At one extreme lies the case of total, irrevocable, and absolute entrenchment of extant constitutional content
against any change, ever.24 At the other extreme is the rule that
would allow ordinary legislativre assemblies to adopt constitutional
amendments by the same procedures they use for ordinary
lawmaking.25
Most real-world constitutionalism, in this respect typified by
American practice and understanding, operates between the extremes - using amendment rules that are distinct from, and more
demanding than, the validity rules for ordinary lawmaking but that
26
do not absolutely and eternally entrench the whole constitution.
We would not feel we had proper self-government if everything that
mattered in our higher law were irrevocably and permanently
placed beyond the people's sovereign reach. Nor would we feel we
had real higher law if our amendment rule did not in some palpable
degree entrench the rest of the Constitution. Finally, an amendment rule does not really entrench the rest of a constitution, in any
specific degree, unless it, itself, is at least relatively entrenched by
its own terms.27 In sum, we denizens of the American legal-cultural
23. 'Thus "amendment" may encompass, on one extreme, the sort of relatively trivial or
housekeeping matter that Bruce Ackerman would class as a "superstatute," see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEoP E: FOUNDATIONS 91 (1991), and, on the other extreme, the sort of
radical break - repealing the First Amendment, for example - that some writers would
distinguish as "revision" or "transformation," see, eg., Murphy, supra note 11, at 176-77, and
others would call "breakdown," see James E. Fleming, We the Exceptional American People,
11 CONST. Comm.355, 371 n.71, 371-72 (citing works of Samuel Freeman and John Rawls).
24. The U.S. Constitution may contain a partial, not total, but nevertheless absolute and
permanent entrenchment, namely, that of the right of each state to insist on its equal suffrage
in the Senate. See U.S. CONsT. art. V. ("May," because it is conceivable, if just barely, that
the entrenchment clause in Article V is itself subject to amendment. See Murphy, supranote
11, at 176 n.41.)
25. Under such a rule, the constitutionalist character of the system, its maintenance of a
differentiation between higher and ordinary lawmaking, could reside only in the expectation
that ordinary lawmakers conscientiously assume the responsibilities of higher lawmakers and that their constituencies hold them accountable accordingly - when they put on their
higher lawmaking hats.
26. An amendment rule approaching the just-like-ordinary lawmaking extreme is recommended, for the time being, for some components of the constitutions of the countries of
eastern Europe by Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein. See supra note 2.
27. Perhaps the idea of a constitution requires absolute entrenchment of an amendment
rule, which in turn at least relatively entrenches everything else. Do you think our own
Article V allows for an amendment of itself (using its own prescribed procedures), that would
make any further amendments, without limitation, accomplishable by ordinary act of Congress? Have we a constitution, then, for only as long as we refrain from amending Article V
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practice cannot make do without a constitutionally contained rule
for amending the Constitution, which is by the same 2token a rule
for preserving the Constitution against undue change. 8
C. Fonnalism
An amendment rule, we now easily see, may prescribe in either
or both of two dimensions, one procedural and the other substantive. Article V visibly prescribes in both dimensions. It sets out
specific procedures for amending the Constitution, and it also contains at least one specific prohibition on amendment content that is, deprivation of any state's equality of suffrage in the Senate
without that state's consent. 29 The central action of Levinson's
book consists of debates about the exclusivity or exhaustiveness, in
both dimensions, of Article V's facial prescriptions. As already
noted, all the debaters seek answers from within, not beyond, the
interpretable Constitution 3o to which the American constitutionalist URR refers all inquirers into these matters. It is common
ground among them that the answers lie in interpretations of the
in that manner? Levinson's authors do not directly address these questions. Recent writing
that does deal with them includes HARRIs,supranote 9, at 176-87; PETFR StER, THm PARADOX OF SELF-AMENDmENT. A STuDY OF LOGIC, LAW, OMNIPOTENCE, AND CHANGE (1990).
28. Levinson gets his show on the road by reminding us that the Framers had a similar
view. See Sanford Levinson, Introduction: Imperfection and Amendability, in IMPERFECTION
3-4. (For good measure we can add that, at least when a constitution purports to have issued
from some temporal authority, as ours purports to have issued from "We the People of the
United States," it logically must - as ours does in Article VII - prescribe terms and conditions for its own coming-into-effect in the first place.)
U.S. CONsT. art. VII provides:
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.
29. See U.S. CoNsr. art. V. As Walter Murphy says, "[T]he prohibition against amending
the clause forbidding the regulation of the importation of slaves self-destructed in 1808." See
Murphy, supra note 11, at 175 nA0. The same is true of the prohibition against amending
population proportionality of direct taxation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
For completeness, we should note the argument that the First Amendment, especially as
incorporated in the Fourteenth, carries its own textually explicit shield against deletion from
the Constitution. This shield, of course, is supposed to be the amendment's opening words
- "Congress shall make no law" (respecting, prohibiting, or abridging certain matters) which the Fourteenth is said to expand to "No state shall make any law." See U.S. CONST.
amends. I, XIV, § 1; Murphy, supranote 11, at 175-76 nA0. This is not on its face a compelling argument. According to Article V, at least, Congress "proposes" and state bodies "ratify" amendments; they do not "make" them. Moreover, the generation that ascribed the
legislation of the Constitution to an act of the people as a whole cannot easily be understood
either to have equated a constitutional amendment with the kind of law that Congress ever
makes or to have encompassed Congress proposing or a state body ratifying an amendment
in "Congress shall make no law." This is no less true despite the recent surfacing of a theory
that treats the serial steps in amendment-making as each the enactment of a law. See
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Artice V: The ConstitutionalLessons of the
Twenty-seventh Amendment 103 YALE L. 677,721-23 (1993). For these and other interpretative objections, see John R. Vile, The Case Against Implicit Limits on the Constitutional
Amending Process,in IMPERFECMTON 191, 196-97, 204-05.
30. See HAmRRs, supra note 9.
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Constitution including, of course, Article V. That does not settle
very much, however, because one has still to choose between relatively formal and nonformal interpretative approaches. By a formal
reading, I mean one that follows the line of least resistance whenever there is one, cleaving to what the great preponderance of lawyers would undoubtedly see as the plain and reasonable meaning of
the law, in all cases in which there is such a thing.3 1 By a nonformal
reading, I mean one that, perhaps because it gives the law a prima
facie unexpected reading, depends for persuasiveness on a transtextual theory about the deeper aims and premises of American government, one that is contestable enough to require support from
somewhat arduous philosophical or historiographical arguments.
Formal readings treat Article V's express prescriptions as exclusive in both the procedural and substantive dimensions. On the
procedural side, a formal reading says that there is no other way to
amend;32 on the substantive side, a formal reading says that there
are no other prohibitions on amendment content.3 3 It takes
nonformal exertion to support contentions that the Constitution
means to open itself to amendment by political events not visibly
conforming to the Article V protocols, 34 just as it does to construe
31. I thus use the notion of interpretative formality in a somewhat different sense from
that in Mark V. lshnet, Anti-Formalismin Recent ConstitutionalTheory, 83 Micn. L. REv.
1502 (1985).
32. See, e.g., David R. Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in IWEmP-crIoN 117.
33. See eg., Vile, supra note 29.
34. Among Levinson's authors, Akhil Amar provides the test case. Amar contends that
the Constitution, rightly construed, provides for amendment by a "mechanism akin to a national referendum, even though that mechanism is not explicitly specified in Article V."
Amar, supranote 10, at 89. His argument is ostensibly formally attired. It is intently focused
on "the narrow text of Article V ... other parts of the original Constitution, various glossing
provisions of the federal Bill of Rights, and various Article V analogues in state constitutions." Id. at 91.
Squint as hard as you like at the words of Article V, the argument runs, and you won't
find any saying that this is "the only way to amend the Constitution." Id. at 90. Carefully
notice the textual reverberations among other parts of the instrument - the references to
"the people" in the Preamble, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments and the Assembly Clause of
the First - and you'll see the higher lawgiving populace reserving to voting majorities of
itself the right to revise their legislative product at will. See id at 103-08. You will also see
Article V falling nicely into place as an exciusive procedural prescription applicable to government-driven, as distinguished from populace-driven, initiatives for change. See id. at 9091.
Neat. But not, standing without more, remotely persuasive to the great bulk of presentday American lawyers. See, eg., Tribe, supra note 22, at 1290 (calling Amar's textual argument "creative," "unconvincing," and "bizarre"). Amar might object that this easily predictable resistance is itself a result of a long-sustained habit of misreading, but that fact, if it is
one, does not change the fact that nonformal argumentation is now required to begin to
counter this resistance. What is required is a transtextual theorization of an American constitutional understanding that is committed to majoritarian popular sovereignty as its all-subsuming first principle, a theorization sure to be contested on the merits, see; eg., Dow, supra
note 32, and one that can hope to establish itself only by appeal to facts of history - themselves contestable - that are external to the constitutional instrument: the Declaration's
equation of governmental legitimacy with the consent of the goirerned, see Amar, supra note
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or infer unmentioned, internal constitutional prohibitions against
egregiously antiliberal or35antidemocratic revisions such as a repeal
of the First Amendment.
D. A Levinsonian Grid
We now have before us - what else? - the makings of a fourfold table. We can permute two classes of readings of Article V,
exclusive or nonexclusive, with two dimensions of amendment-rule
prescription, procedural and substantive, to construct four possible
positions. Regarding Article V's procedural exclusivity one can,
like David Dow 36 and John Vile,37 affirm it; or one can, like Bruce
Ackerman38 and Akhil Amar,3 9 deny it. Regarding textually inexplicit limitations on amendment content one can, like Bruce Ackerman 40 and John Vile,41 deny them; or one can, like Walter
Murphy42 and Akhil Amar,43 affirm them. Among the five authors
just mentioned, we find one consistent exclusivist, John Vile; one
consistent nonexclusivist, Akhil Amar; and one straddler between
procedural nonexclusivism and substantive exclusivism, Bruce Ackerman. We have no clear exemplar of the converse straddle,
between procedural exclusivism (clear) and substantive nonexclusi10, at 89-92, and the arguments of lawyers (including James Madison) caught in the need to
explain how state ratifications of the Constitution would not violate the amendment rules of
the state constitutions, see id. at 97. For disagreement with Amar's historical readings, see
Ackerman, supra note 10, at 69 n.3; Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional
Founding - (forthcoming).
On the ultimately nonformal character of Amar's argument, see Dow, supra note 32, at
138 n.91 ("The Constitution, by virtue of embodying republican principles, thereby embodies
a certain right - the right of the people to alter their government whenever a majority so
demands. This, ultimately, is the essence of Amar's claim"). I do not mean - and neither, I
believe, does Dow - that the argument's nonformality is a fatal defect in itself. Dow rejects
the argument, but only after contesting its normative-theoretic and historiographical
supports.
35. Here, it is hard to think of even a weakly plausible counterexample. Walter Murphy
makes reference to the fact that Article V speaks only of amendment, not revision or transformation, and to the possibility of "prohibitions embedded in the structure of the text." He
does not suggest that the first factor can carry the burden of the argument, and he points out
that the second "bleeds into" what has to be the real, load-bearing part of any argument for
substantive limits, namely, "normative theories on which a constitutional democracy is
based." See Murphy, supra note 11, at 176-78.
36. See Dow, supra note 32.
37. For Vile's formalist inclination regarding the procedure question, one must look beyond Levinson's book. See JomN R. VnE, CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS SURROUNDINo THE
CONSTrTUTONAL AMENDING PROCESS 85-87 (1993).

38. See Ackerman, supra note 10.
39. See Amar, supra note 10.
40. See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
41. See Vile, supra note 29.
42. See Murphy, supra note 11.
43. See supra notes 10, 29. One might also mention here Sotirios Barber and William
Harris. See supra note 13.
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vism (unclear). 44 Walter Murphy, so far as I am aware, has not spoken to the question of procedural exclusivity, so he cannot be
classified as either consistent or a straddler. 45
Above, at the end of section C, we noticed a correlation between exclusivist conclusions and formalist interpretative methods.
In light of this observation, two questions come to mind about the
fourfold table we have just constructed. First, to what extent, if
any, is it the case that those who occupy the "consistent" positions
- exclusivist or nonexclusivist - are there by reason of formalist
or antiformalist methodological inclination or commitment? Second, do the straddle positions disclose, on the straddlers' parts, an
objectionable inconsistency?
In the next two parts of this essay, I try to gauge the significance
of the formalist-nonformalist opposition as it appears on Levinson's
pages. Part III looks closely at a controversy between Bruce Ackerman and David Dow over the procedural exclusivity of Article V.
It concludes that the distance between the two on the formalism
axis, which Dow, in particular, treats as significant in its own right,
may be best understood as reflecting a difference on matters of
value distinct from issues of interpretative method. Part IV returns
to the fourfold grid and generalizes the suggestion that an apparent
break or difference in interpretative method is perhaps best understood as reflecting a transmethodological concern - without, however, concluding that the straddlers are being objectionably
inconsistent or opportunistic. That question we take up in Part V.
I.

Dow AND ACKERMAN

We consider here a fight that David Dow's essay picks with
Bruce Ackerman's. I put the matter that way because it seems to
me that Dow finds disagreement between the two in a place where
Ackerman might very well not.46
44. David Dow has expressly rejected substantive nonexclusivism. See David R. Dow,
ConstitutionalMidrash. The Rabbis' Solution to Professor Bickel's Problem, 29 Hous. L.

REv.543 (1992) [hereinafter Dow, ConstitutionalMidrash].
45. Murphy takes such broad views both of what "the Constitution" consists of and what
"interpretation" involves that the question of express amendment procedures may well strike
him as much less important than Ackerman, for example, considers it to be. See eg., Walter
F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism,and Democracy, in CONSTrTUONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY. TRANsmONS INTm CoNim'ipoRARY WoRLD 3,7-20 (Douglas Greenberg et
al. eds., 1993).
46. Levinson placed Dow's essay after Ackerman's in the series, so insofar as there really
is mutually recognized disagreement between the two authors, it may simply have fallen to
Dow's lot rather than Ackerman's to voice the disagreement. It should perhaps be noted,
though, that Dow's essay - adapted for Levinson's book from an article originally published
in 1990, see David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of
Article V, 76 IowA L. REv.1 (1990); Dow, supra note 32, at 117 n.* - does not make any
direct reference to the paper Ackerman prepared for this collection. Cf.Dow, supra note 44,
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Dow yokes Ackerman together with Akhil Amar. Both authors, he says, commit the same, two-fold mistake: First they posit
a counter majoritarian difficulty, then they try to "dissolve" the difficulty "by transforming... the [constitutional] amendment process
into a majoritarian exercise." 47 In Dow's account, in other words,
both authors get off on the wrong foot by mistakenly supposing that
judicial review needs reconciling with majority rule,48 and that mistake draws them into the graver error of crediting to majoritarian
provenance the higher law that reviewing courts bring to bear on
ordinary acts of government. Against such works of reconciliation,
Dow objects that there really is nothing out there that wants resolving at all. The "so-called 'difficulty,' -49 he writes, is a product of
failure to grasp the most basic of all facts about American constitutionalism, which is that at the very bottom of it - as a part of what
Frederick Schauer and others might well call our ultimate rule of
recognition 50
lie a pair of precepts whose simultaneous truth for
us, or normative force for us, may be problematic but is nevertheless "what we believe." We believe in - we are in our constitutional culture and practice as a matter of fact wholeheartedly
committed to - "majority rule," and no less wholeheartedly are we
committed to the belief that "not everything ought to be subject to
it."'51 Efforts to collapse this dualist structure into its majoritarian
pole are, then, simply misconceived. Like "the ostensible difficulty
itself," such efforts "rest[ ] on a misunderstanding of the ontology
of a higher law system." They overlook the fact that
such a system
'52
"intends, on occasion, to frustrate majority will."
For us as Americans practicing the Constitution, Dow writes,
"[f]ollowing the majority because it is the majority is sometimes obligatory; resisting the majority even though it is the majority is sometimes required. 53 This problematic conjunction of normative
-

at 546 n.14 (opining that historical material offered by Ackerman after Dow's 1990 article
does not bear on the "analytical disagreement" between the two authors).

47. Dow, supra note 32, at 129-30.
48. Id. at 118-19.
49. I. at 118.

50. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; Dow, ConstitutionalMidrash, supra note
44, at 548 (asserting that the simultaneous norms of "majoritarianism" and "rights" are constitutive of American "legal culture").
51. Dow, supra note 32, at 119.
52. Id. at 130.

53. Id.at 119 (emphasis in original). We should note, for future reference, a somewhat
different formulation of the duality of precepts, which Dow draws from rabbinical sources,
but by which he apparently means also to describe the characteristic form of American constitutionalist understanding. From the biblical injunction that we "not follow a multitude to
do evil," Dow reports,
[the] rabbis inferred that, except when the majority is doing evil, it is commanded to
follow the majority. At the same time.., the most general overarching principle of
Jewish law is not to follow the majority, but to do what is just and good.... [T]he just-
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givens "constitute[s] the essence of our political being." 54 Correlatively, in Dow's argument, this conjunction structures the "ontology
of a higher law system," meaning a system in which the legislative
wills of present majorities are subordinate to higher law.55 That, of
course, is an ontology that would be subverted or deconstructed by
envisioning the source or legislator of the higher law as, itself, a

simple-majoritarian popular sovereign or We-the-People. Precisely
such a subversion is what Dow says both Ackerman and Amar
would effect by their misguided quests for resolution, or "reconciliation," of the dualist, structuring"tension that lies at the heart, or in
the soul, of American constitutionalism.
Dow's affirmative claim, his claim about what we believe, is refined and careful. He has our beliefs hewing faithfully to the idea
of popular sovereignty, the idea that the People legislating are the
only legitimate, ultimate source of higher law.5 6 He apparently allows that collective self-rule, starting from scratch, may faute de
mieux have to get itself' going by a primeval majority setting the
protocol for the next stage. He insists that, according to our beliefs,
such a majority has both good reason to "agree today that it will
take more than a mere majority tomorrow" to legislate in certain
ways and legitimate power thus to bind its posterity to
supermajoritarian constraints. 57 In sum, Dow confines his com-

plaint against the would-be reconcilers to their attempts to equate
popular sovereignty now with simple majoritarianism and, accordand-good desideratum can act as an exception to a particular rule ... enunciated by a
majority. The principle of majority rule does not override the overarching commandment to do what is "just and good."
Id. at 121 (citations omitted).
This formulation of our duality of beliefs differs from the one in the main text in this
respect: The latter leaves open the possibility that a higher law laid down by a supermajority
(for example, by the supermajoritarian procedures prescribed by Article V) is legally valid
and civilly obligatory, regardless of any moral evaluation we might independently make of it.
The rabbinical formulation may well seem to foreclose this possibility. How, after all, can a
multitude of any size or proportion - a supermajority any more than a majority - be allowed to lead us into evil or to override the ultimate injunction to abide by the just and the
good?
54. Id. at 119.
55. Id. at 130. This subordination of majority Will to higher law must be envisioned, I
think, as constant and without exception, not as occasional or exceptionable. If, as Dow says,
resisting the majority is only "sometimes" required, that must be because the higher law
doesn't fill the normative space. (It can't be that there is applicable higher law but that
majority rule overrides it.) It would be entirely consistent with this view of "our beliefs" to
say that, according to these beliefs, not everything ought to be subject to higher law (higher
law ought not to fill the normative space; it ought rather to leave majority rule its due), just as
not everything ought to be subject to majority rule.
56. See Dow, supra note 32, at 119-22. But see supra note 53.
57. Dow, supra note 32, at 122. A similar argument appears in an unpublished paper by
Lawrence G. Sager. See Lawrence G. Sager, The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution
(1995) (presented to the N.Y.U. Colloquium on Constitutional Theory, February, 1995).
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ingly, 58
to detect events of higher legislation in simple electoral
tallies.
Dow's picture of what we American constitutionalists believe,
59
his picture of our dualistic constitutionalist ontology, is accurate.
What is puzzling, though, is Dow's stated ground for complaint
against the writings of Ackerman. The gravamen of the central
charge that Dow brings against Ackerman is disregard of the
higher-law ontology. In Ackerman's vocabulary, the charge would
be written as: "Monistic Democracy[!]" 60 But Ackerman is, by his
own avowal at any rate, decidedly no monist; neither is he a61simpleelectoral-majoritarian when it comes to higher lawmaking.
Let us consider at greater length what Ackerman might say in
response to Dow. Here is a picture of what I take Dow to mean by
the ontology of a higher law system:
Ultimte Rule
oReognition

LAW
democray-->law
The box called "LAW" is the Constitution, higher law, chartering
the processes of ordinary democratic government and limiting the
allowable legislative output of those processes. Inside the box we
see ordinary-level democracy, thus chartered, legislating ordinary
law, thus limited. This whole set-up is depicted here as an imaginative product, an emanation from a what-we-believe - cultural facts
58. For Dow's critical reading of Ackerman as locating "constitutional politics" in elections, see, for example, Dow, supra note 32, at 125, 125 n.36.
59. See, eg., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic; 97 YALE L2.1493, 1499-1503 (1988).
60. See Acxmu
, supra note 23, at 7-10.
61. Ackerman's view is "authoritarian" in a sense I have previously identified, see
Michelman, supra note 59, at 1520-21: that is, the view requires that any "transformative"
change in judicially cognizable constitutional meanings be licensed by an identifiable intervening event of higher lawmaking by the People. Authoritarianism in this sense is certainly
not facially incompatible with democratic dualism, because it does not equate higher lawmaking by the People with ordinary or simple-majoritarian politics. Is there, however, some
argument waiting to be made that this sort of authoritarianism would be normatively defensible (if at all) only on premises that also imply monistic democracy? If so, the argument is not
broached by any contribution to Levinson's volume. (Possible beginnings of such an argument appear in Miriam Galston & William A. Galston, Reason, Consent, and the U.S. Constitutior Bruce Ackerman's We the People, 104 ETmcs 446,465 (1994) (reviewing ACKERMAN,
supra note 23, and suggesting that rejection of rights foundationalism leaves no basis for
attributing special value to deliberative as opposed to ordinary politics); Frederick Schauer,
DeliberatingAbout Deliberation, 90 MlicL L. REv. 1187, 1189-90 (1992) (same).
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informing a "practice" 62 (or, perhaps, a form of life) - that the
artist has named, in good modem legal-positivist style, an ultimate
rule of recognition.
Now, it would seem that what marks this drawing as a picture of,
specifically, a higher law ontology is its differentiation of "LAW"
from "law," a differentiation without which there could be no depiction of LAW standing in a limiting relation to both "democracy"
and the "law" that democracy makes. But then this next drawing,
too, depicts a higher law ontology:
Ultimte Rule
of Recognition

DEMOCRAC

-, LAW
[democracylawI

This picture preserves the hierarchical differentiation of higher
LAW from ordinary law, so it, too, portrays a higher-law system.
The system and its ontology don't stop being higher-law just because they add in a higher-level DEMOCRACY (the constitutional
politics of Us the People to be distinguished from lower-case democracy, the ordinary politics of representative government), and
attribute the higher status of the higher law to its being a product of
DEMOCRACY. Whatever objection anyone may have to this picture, it can't be that it "misunderstands the ontology of a higher law
system."
The drawings correspond to the first two of the three rival pictures of Aiierican constitutionalist ontology that Ackerman sets
forth under the respective names of Rights Foundationalism, Dualist Democracy, and Monistic Democracy. 63 Dualist Democrats
stand arm in arm with Rights Foundationalists, together defending
the ramparts of higher law ontology against the onslaughts of Monistic Democracy. Ackerman, of course, has declared loudly for
Dualist Democracy. 64 No doubt there is a major bone of contention between the two higher law camps - as Ackerman puts it,
"the dualist's Constitution is democratic first, rights-protecting sec62. See Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions,supra note 3, at 150 (following the lead
of A.W.B. Simpson).
63. See AcRmAN, supra note 23, at 6-15.
64. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 10, at 65-66.
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ond" whereas the Rights Foundationalist "reverses this priority" 65
but higher-lawism is not that bone. So what is Dow's beef with
Ackerman?
Dow says it has something to do with Ackerman's equating the
sovereign People with simple voting majorities, and with his equating higher lawmaking with voter behavior in ordinary elections. 66
Perhaps it is true that anyone who makes those equations forfeits
dualist credentials. The trouble, the puzzle, is that Ackerman - at
least on the face of his writings - does not make such equations;
he rejects them. True, he claims that constitutional amendment can
occur "structurally," outside Article V as formalistically construed.
But not only has he not said, he has vigorously denied, that any
simple voting majority, or indeed any fraction of votes in any given
election, can accomplish a structural amendment. 67
Let us take a closer look. Ackerman has put on the table a concrete proposal for an improved institutional arrangement for higher
lawmaking. 68 It calls for a concatenation of approvals from the
President, supermajorities of both houses of Congress, and
supermajorities of voters in two elections separated by a quadrennium. That looks like an expression of supermajoritarian thinking.
(For that matter, even a rule that required no more than a concurrence of simple electoral majorities in two quadrennially separated
elections would be a supermajoritarian rule, not a simplemajoritarian one.69) The processes Ackerman has described of inexplicit or structural amendment consistently involve repeated elections, and, moreover, never elections alone but rather always
elections serially compounded with other events involving all three
branches in our separated-and-divided-powers system of government. 70 These Ackermanian amendment schemata certainly seem
to be of supermajoritarian design. Finally, Ackerman denies that
any of the acting bodies, taken apart from the serial compounding
of their actions, is the People. His argument has been that the Peo65. AcKERmAN, supra note 23, at 13.

66. See Dow, supra note 32, at 125 & n.36.
67. See eg., AcKEazAN, supra note 23, at 277-78.
68. See id. at 54-55.
69. When simple majorities of two overlapping but nonidentical constituencies are required in order to pass a resolution, a nay-saying minority can prevail over a yea-saying
majority of the combined constituencies, even assuming that voters common to both constituencies vote the same way both times. For example: Constituency A consists of voters One
through Eleven. Constituency B consists of voters One through Eight, Twelve, Thirteen, and
Fourteen. One through Four vote "yes" both times. Five through Eight vote "no" both
times. In A, Nine through Eleven vote yes. In B, Twelve and Thirteen vote no and Fourteen
votes yes. The resolution fails in B, 6-5, and so it fails the repeated-elections test, even
though it carried in A, 7-4. All told, 12 votes were cast in favor, 10 against. Counting voters
rather than votes, 8 were in favor, 6 opposed. On any view, a minority ruled.
70. See, eg., Ackerman, supra note 10, at 78-84.
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ple, or rather the voice of the People, is what the serial compound
of events may on occasion be allowed to represent.71 So again one
asks: What is Dow's beef?
The most straightforward answer, if we can make it stick, is:
The beef is just what the title of Dow's essay - "The Plain Meaning of Article V" - suggests and a good deal of his text addresses,
namely, the conflict between Ackerman's nonformalist interpretative denial and Dow's formalist affirmation of the exclusivity of Article V. Given that what is mainly puzzling us is Dow's charge
against Ackerman of "misunderstanding the ontology of a higher
law system," the problem then is to understand how Dow thinks
Ackerman's interpretative rejection of Article V exclusivity evinces
such a misunderstanding. 72 Ackerman denies that it does, and his
denial has to be reckoned with. As Ackerman presents the case,
rejection of Article V exclusivity is certainly not rejection of the
Article's status as higher law. It is, rather, interpretation of the Article as nonexclusive. 73 That interpretative account leaves exclusivity-rejection in perfect conceptual harmony with higher-lawism and
dualism.
Yet there is much that is cogent to be said, too, on Dow's side of
the debate. As Dow forcefully contends, 74 the inevitably somewhat
vaguely defined "structural" amendment processes endorsed by
Ackerman can never be known with certainty to have been qualitatively "higher" than ordinary majoritarian politics, nor can the text
of the resultant higher law ever be securely demarcated from interpretations of this (quasi) text.75 These consequences, along with
the very tolerance for strongly nonformal interpretation that is required in order to credit Ackerman's historically based argument
for the nonexclusive reading of Article V, may very well be thought
to weaken in practice what higher law ontology requires in theory
that is, a clear and firm separation, and insulation, of higher
law
76
from both ordinary politics and ultraplastic interpretation.
71. See, e.g., AcK-Rm~AN, supra note 23, at 236, 260-62.
72. See Dow, supra note 32, at 130 (discussing Amar and Ackerman).
73. See Ackerman, supra note 10, at 71-74.
74. See Dow, supra note 32, at 122, 127, 131-36.
75. For example, Ackerman contends that a certain series of political events in the mid1930s eventuated in a "New Deal" amendment to the Constitution. Ackerman, supra note
10, at 79-82. But because these events never focused on a finite prescriptive text, the meaning in application of this putative amendment, at the time of its supposed occurrence, remained to be interpolated by "synthetic" interpretative exertions of the Supreme Court.
Levinson's spoof: "'Congress may pass any regulation it believes conducive to the national
health, safety, or welfare so long as the conduct regulated has any link whatsoever with "interstate commerce,"' ".Levinson, supra note 28, at 7-8, must be understood as initiating a
commentator's redaction of the Court's interpretations (as of the time he wrote it) of a textless amendment, not a formulation of the shadow-text the Court has been interpreting.
76. Dow has not been alone in advertising these weaknesses in Ackerman's position. For
a recent statement, see Tribe, supra note 22, at 1247, 1279-80, 1302.
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These, however, must be classed as prudential objections to
Ackerman's proposals. They have not, yet, risen to the kind of conceptual or visionary level required to sustain a charge of failure on
Ackerman's part to grasp or respect the higher law ontology. Ackerman, after all, stoutly professes the dualist ontology against monist opposition. What is more, he admits the prudential objections to
nonformal amendment, although he finds them outweighed, at least
pending an improved Article V, by an opposite prudential concern,
one that itself has dualist roots, namely, the risk of "false negatives"
- cases of blockage of what is in fact a present higher-democratic
will - arising from strict Article V formalism. 77 Ackerman, in
sum, can very plausibly claim that he and Dow are at one on the
concept of a higher law system, and disagree only on its practical
effectuation.
Would such a claim, however, be unassailable? Dow might attack it in the following way. Ackerman's conceptions of the People
and their higher lawmaking, Dow might well say, are majoritarian
at heart, not supermajoritarian. As Ackerman himself explains his
own view of what we believe, the proper test for any purported
higher lawmaking is approbation of the People, understood as a
true or "mobilized" majority of the populace: a majority of the populace, but counted by giving special weight to the fraction of them
that in its address to the pending question is focused, informed, deliberate, public-spirited, and, finally, deeply persuaded. 78 In this
Ackermanian account, supermajoritarian procedures have no virtue
as counter-majoritarian or minoritarian. 79 To the contrary: the minoritarian bias of supermajoritarian processes is a vice, in Ackerman's view, because it can result in "false-negative" obstruction of
a present mobilized-majoritarian higher lawmaking will.80 If, despite this vice, Ackerman has us relying on supermajoritarian
processes for higher lawmaking, that is because such processes are
nevertheless, on balance, the best indicators we can devise for the
presence of a simple majority of the properly requisite kind, a mobilized simple majority.
So the possibility is now before us that Dow's beef with Ackerman is this: Ackerman portrays the true, deep spirit of American
constitutionalism as promajoritarian. He does differentiate between higher and ordinary lawmaking processes, but the differentiation is strictly between processes that do and processes that do not
77. See AcrEIiAN, supra note 23, at 278-80; Ackerman, supra note 10, at 84-86.
78. See AcKrmAN, supra note 23, at 274-75, 285-88.
79. Compare Dow, supra note 32, at 121 ("Implicit in this legal structure is protection of
minority interests. That is, it may be 'just and good' to protect the minority even when the
majority would not be so inclined.").
80. See, e.g., AcKEnmAN, supra note 23, at 280.
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merit attribution of their product to true, or mobilized, majorities.
When and only when such attributions are deemed merited, then,
by Ackerman's lights, the product is higher law, and it is, in such a
case, higher law regardless of its consonance with minority rights or
"justice and the good. '81 Insofar as Dow holds that this is contrary
to what we believe - insofar as Dow holds that what we believe is
that there are some normative contents that no simple majority, no
matter how "mobilized" or qualitatively excellent, can validate as
higher law - Dow does have a real beef with Ackerman. This, you
may be thinking, would hardly be a surprising conclusion, given that
the Dow we have just described is a Dow who reads as rightsfoundationally inflected - as making the Constitution rights-protecting first and democratic only second - the American ultimate
rule of recognition.
If you are thinking that, wait a minute. I do not know whether
the "rights foundationalist" description I have just offered of Dow's
belief about what we believe would please Dow or displease him,
but I think I do know how he could evade it if he wanted. He could
say that, in his account of what we believe, there is no reference,
ever, to any substantive limit on what supermajorities can validly
legislate as higher law; the only validity requirements for higher
lawmaking are for supermajorities as opposed to simple majorities.
In return, we might ask Dow, as we did above, s2 how we or anyone
could possibly believe that there are considerations of minority
rights, or of "the just and the good," that a supermajority can override even though a mere majority cannot.
Dow's best rejoinder, I think, would run along lines suggested
by Lawrence Sager, in a recent paper that Levinson might well consider for inclusion in his next edition. 83 According to Sager's argument, we believe our Constitution to be justice-seeking; we believe,
furthermore, that it is not always clear exactly where justice lies,
that disagreements about this can be deep, and that these deep disagreements cannot always be consensually resolved in real time in
this world; we believe, too, that a person's right to participate in the
processes that determine such questions, in the course of determining the higher laws of her country, is itself a component of justice;
and we believe, finally and in light of all the foregoing, that an aptly
designed supermajoritarian process of higher lawmaking is the best
justice-seeking device available to us.84
81. Compare Dow, supra note 32, at 121.
82. See id.
83. See Sager, supra note 57.
84. Sager develops the reasons for this last belief along Rawlsian lines:
The obduracy of the Constitution to amendment requires of members of the ratifying
generation that they choose for the Constitution principles and provisions not just for
themselves but for their children and their children's children; while the geographic di-

1316

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:1297

This is a plausible set of beliefs, apparently capable of explaining how we might understand Dow as a supermajoritarian dualist
constitutionalist, and yet as one who is neither, in Ackerman's
terms, a Rights Foundationalist (Dow would on this account be a
supermajoritarian proceduralist)8 5 nor a Dualist Democrat (Dow
would not be making the Constitution put democracy before rightsprotection). Interestingly, then - although neither any contributor
nor the impresario himself takes note of this fact - the Levinson
papers reveal that Ackerman's tripartite division of the territory,
into Rights Foundationalist-Dualist Democrat-Democratic Monist,
is not exhaustive.
Notice, now, that a Sagerite self-explanation by Dow, were he to
adopt it, would come at a price, and the price would be exposure to
an ad hominem retort from those who stand charged by him with
mistakenly trying to reconcile or dissolve a tension - between majority rule and higher law - that we do better to work at sustaining. For Dow's position, thus explained, would be the
symmetrical converse of Ackerman's. Just as Ackerman repairs to
supermajoritarian process as a proxy for true majority rule, Dow
would be repairing to supermajoritarian process as an approximation for the true law of justice and the good.8 6 If so, then just insofar as it can fairly be said of Ackerman that he collapses the
majority-rule-higher-law tension into its majority-rule pole, it could
equally fairly be said of Dow that he collapses the tension into its
higher-law pole.
I do not think, however, that this charge of tension destruction
is aptly directed at either of the parties. I think we would be mistaken to direct it at Dow, just as, by the same token, I think he was
mistaken to direct it at Ackerman. Both these authors are loyal
dualists, upholding the tension of the higher law ontology against
versity demanded by Article V is a reasonable proxy for a broad diversity of circumstances among those who must join in endorsing changes in the text of the Constitution.
The result is a structural tendency in popular constitutional decisionmaking towards the
choice of general principles attractive and acceptable to persons in a variety of actual
human circumstance, imagining their application over time to generations unborn in circumstances unknown.
Sager, supra note 57, at 3-4 (typescript draft of Feb. 1995).
85. That is, it would remain true for him that "supermajoritarianism, just like majority
rule, implies that decisions are legitimated by their source, not their content." Holmes &
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 278.
86. Dow may or not believe that there is an objectively "true" law of justice out there,
awaiting discovery. His text is silent on that question. But what it seems he must at a minimum believe, in order for his essay to have any motivation or point, is that Americans have
reason to organize their collective political life as if such a thing existed. And that is enough
to sustain the symmetry I allege between his position and Ackerman's. For it is at least
equally doubtful that Ackerman believes there really is any such thing as the People, to be
spoken for by a "mobilized majority" of the franchised populace of the country. On both
sides of the symmetry, then, it may be regulative ideas rather than recondite-but-in-principlediscoverable objects that are being approximated.
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ideological pressures. It is just that the pressures they experience
come from opposite ideological directions. It seems that behind the
attraction of Ackerman and Dow, respectively, to supermajoritarian institutional devices there stand opposite ideological
pulls - toward majoritarian democracy and the sovereignty of the
people in Ackerman's case, toward justice and the sovereignty of
the right in Dow's. This difference might, then, explain our two
authors' differing levels of tolerance for dilutions of formality in
higher lawmaking and higher-legal interpretation - their different
weightings of the counterbalancing risks of false negatives and of
weakened higher law ontology.
It is that methodological disagreement - that distance between
their stances on the formalism axis - which is, in fact, the ostensible bone of contention between them. But it reflects, I am suggesting, something else: an interminable, unresolvable, duality of
first principles in American political thought.
IV. FoRM

AND SUBSTANCE

Recall that, when speaking above of debates over the meaning
of Article V, we used "procedural exclusivity" to name the view
that Article V lays out the only procedural routes to valid amendments, while using "substantive exclusivity" to name the view that
Article V contains the only prohibition - against tampering with
representation in the Senate - against the content of amendments.87 Near the end of Part II, we mapped out four positions in
the exclusivity debates. 88 I now want to assign labels to each of the
four.
Those who support exclusivity in both dimensions, as a formal
interpretation apparently would require, might conceivably be
called either "consistent formalists" or "consistent exclusivists."
Our exemplar for this position is John Vile, and I shall suggest that
"consistent exclusivist" is the apter name for him. Those who, using
nonformal arguments as they must, support nonexclusivity in both
dimensions - Akhil Amar is our exemplar - are best called "consistent nonexclusivists." Those, like Bruce Ackerman, who straddle
between procedural nonexclusivism and substantive exclusivism,
are "democratic dualists." Finally, a straddler between procedural
exclusivism and substantive nonexclusivism (such as Walter Murphy conceivably may be 89) are "rights-based dualists." The choices
of nomenclature call for explanation.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35.
88. See id.
89. David Dow has expressly rejected substantive nonexcIusivism. See supra note 44.
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Start with the third position. The Ackermanian straddler
strongly refuses formal interpretation on the procedural side. He
cannot, then, convincingly defend his substantive-side exclusivism
by appeal to independent values of interpretative formality. 90 So
how then, if you hold this straddle position, do you explain it, except on substantive-visionary, dualist-democratic grounds? It is
right for Americans, you will have to say - either right absolutely
or a correct interpretation of what Americans are bound to by past
and present practice - that a mobilized majority of the People
should be free to declare their higher lawmaking will whatever that
may be, and that their higher-legislative declarations should outrank anything that ordinary politicians may try to legislate to the
contrary. Against that all-subsuming popular-democratic value or
commitment, you will have to say, no barriers stand whether procedural or substantive. Because that seems inescapably the defense
of the position, "democratic dualist" seems the apt name for it.
Now consider the fourth position, the converse straddle. It, too,
is indefensible on the basis of independent values of formality.
Reasoning in parallel with our analysis of the third position, we easily find that what lies behind it can only be the idea - again, allegedly either absolutely right or a correct interpretation of the
American way - of a prepolitical, predemocratic, higher law of
justice and rights against which no political preference may be allowed to transgress. (Of course, these could be, or include, rights to
live under a regime of collective self-government to which one has
appropriate access.) "Rights-based dualism" is, therefore, an apt
name for it.
The first position, it may seem, can sidestep the ideological issues in which the third and fourth are inevitably embroiled, by
pressing on the distinct values of formality in legal interpretation, of
letting "the rule of law" be "a law of rules." 91 Whoever we think
the higher lawgiver is, the first position's defenders may say,
whatever we think is the ultimate sign of the higher law's validation,
we should strive to construe all law, including this law, as straightforwardly and plainly as possible. Things simply work better that
way: calculability is enabled, liberty is enhanced, accountability is
clarified, everyday democracy is respected, and legal-rule appliers

90. It is for this reason that Ackerman's appeals, which he does in fact make on behalf of
substantive-side exclusivism, to the entrenched, prereflective understandings of lawyers,
strike some listeners as surprising and incongruous coming from him. See, e.g., Fleming,
supra note 27, at 372-73. For a survey of the independent values of formality, see Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Ciu. L REV. 1175, 1175-81 (1989).
91. See Scalia, supra note 90.
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are appropriately emboldened. 92 Maybe a dualist democrat will
complain to you that the price of your choice for formalism, and
hence for exclusivity in both dimensions, is suppression of democracy. Maybe a rights-based dualist will complain to you that the
price is endangerment of rights. To either complaint you can answer: "Yes, but formality has its values, too, and in this matter I
rank those the highest of all." Your antagonists may think you misguided, they may call you single-minded or extremist, but your consistency seems beyond reproach. That would make you a
"consistent formalist."
Perhaps the name fits Justice Scalia. 93 But it does not seem apt
for our exemplary both-sides exclusivist, Professor Vile. His view
seems to be more substantive-visionary. It seems to depend in considerable part on a judgment that Article V, read straightforwardly,
has settled matters - including working relations among the
branches of government - pretty well on both the procedural and
substantive dimensions. 94 "Consistent exclusivist," then, would
seem the fairer name for him.
An occupant of position two -

Amar, for our purposes -

is

undoubtedly a consistent nonformalist so far as we can see. He
must hold to nonformalist principles, at least in some degree, at
least for this case: Law will be dysfunctional, people will not be
free, lawmakers (Framers) frozen in anticipation of interpretative
bean-counting will not be able to legislate as responsively and intelligently as they wish, unless interpreters take it upon themselves to
treat the law as guided by ends and suffused with values that are not
expressly enacted but are rather to be drawn from the context of
enactment. But because it is in the nature of nonformalist interpretation to be somewhat open-ended and indeterminate, one can
hardly suppose that an occupant of position two - a nonexclusivist
on both the procedural and substantive dimensions - is there just
because of nonformalist commitments. In fact, that seems prima
facie unlikely. It seems he must be there, in part, because he holds
to a notion or theory of rights and good government - again,
either transcendently or immanently derived - to the effect that
contemporary, considerate majorities simply must be allowed to
have their way. In that case, which I take to be Amar's, the more
92. See id. John Vile's exclusivist declarations seem generally sympathetic to values of
legal formality, see Vile, supra note 29, at 197-98, 205-06,211-12; VILE, supranote 37, at 8687, but do not depend primarily on them. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
93. This conclusion is uncertain, however. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism,
and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 301, 321-28 (1993).
94. See, eg., Vile, supranote 29, at 198-200; VnLE, supra note 37, at 86-87. Of course, an
ostensible consistent formalist might be using formalist pretensions to mask precisely the
same substantive-visionary belief.
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expressive name for him is "consistent nonexclusivist," not "consistent nonformalist." 95
The sum of this quick study, of evidence offered by Levinson's
volume, is as follows: On the terrain of interpretative dispute over
the meaning of the amendment rule in American constitutionalism,
methodological variations - variations in positions along the formality axis - should presumptively be construed as secondary, not
primary. They are unlikely to have been assumed independently of
extra-methodological, ideological perceptions or concerns. John
Vile's consistent exclusivism is not, in all probability, a result of his
being a committed formalist (if he is), but rather appears to flow
from at least partially independent judgments of fact and value.
Akhil Amar's consistent nonexclusivism is almost certainly not a
result of his being an enthusiastic nonformalist, which he does not,
in fact, appear to be. 96 As for the straddlers, their views obviously
cannot finally depend on methodological factors alone.
V.

CONSISTENT STRADDLES

"Entrenchment" of a piece of higher law means, let us say, that
the piece cannot be repealed by any purported procedure of
amendment. By analogy to Ackermanian "structural amendment,"
and with an eye to American "constitutional tradition and practice," one might contend in favor of "structural entrenchment" of
certain components of constitutional-legal substance, certain "constitutive principles" or "fundamental rights." One might, that is,
interpretatively - if necessarily nonformally - conclude that such
entrenchments are contained in fact in the Constitution understood
as codified projection of the American URR. 97
Bruce Ackerman, apostle of structural-amendment theory,
stands outspokenly opposed to structural-entrenchment theory. 98
Were the People to use Article V to declare both an establishment
of Christianity as our state religion and a prohibition of all other
religious observance, Ackerman believes the American URR
would require us all to regard this "deep transformation of our heritage" as nonetheless valid higher lawmaking. 99 Suppose the People
were then to add a further amendment making advocacy of repeal
95. Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword The Justices of Rules and Standards,106 HARV.
L. REv. 22, 123 (1992) (examining "the cycle of rules and standards" in the work of Supreme
Court justices and concluding that the answer to the question whether it is "the virtues of
form" or "the substance to be governed" that drives the choice is: "both").
96. See supra note 13, 34.
97. See JoHN RAWLS, PoLTcICAL LmERAusM 239 (1993); Fleming, supranote 27, at 37172; supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
98. This is just another way. of describing Ackerman's "straddle" between procedural
nonexclusivism and substantive exclusivism when it comes to interpreting Article V.
99. See AcRmRAN, supra note 23, at 14-15.
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of the Christianity establishment a capital crime. The People would
thus, in effect, by their obvious aim of blocking popular reconsideration of a piece of higher law, be "repeal[ing] dualist democracy
itself." Even then, Ackerman would refuse to conclude that their
higher lawmaking action could be deemed invalid. He is explicit, at
least, that judges have no "general authority to protect the fundamental principles of dualist democracy against repudiation by the
People."'o0
We have already noticed the "evident incongruity" between
Ackerman's nonformal interpretative receptivity to structural
amendment and the formalist tendency of his rhetoric rejecting
structural entrenchment.' 0 ' It is jarring to find that someone who
works so hard to defend a nonformal reading of Article V on the
procedural side would come on as "an Article V positivist" - as
James E. Fleming remarks - when the question on the table is
substantive amendment limits.' 0 2 Does this rhetorical incongruity
disclose a deeper inconsistency in Ackerman's position?
Initially, it does not seem so. Had Ackerman sought to trace his
procedural argument back to a transcendent standard for what an
amendment rule properly is or ought to be, then eyebrows might
well rise in response to his relentless "positivism" when the question on the table is substantive limits on amendment. Ackerman,
however, has not pursued such a route. Rather, he has developed
his procedural claim out of an immanent account - an interpretation, however nonformal - of American constitutionalism as he
claims it is and has been. In that sense, at least, Ackerman has been
consistently positivist across the board.10 3
Surely, however, Fleming meant "positivist," as he applied the
term to Ackerman's approach to the entrenchment question, not in
our sense of immanentist but in the quite different sense of what we
have been calling interpretative formalism. 0 4 Fleming was con100. Id. at 15 n.t. It is possible, and it may sometimes be important, to distinguish the
question of what judges are authorized to disregard from the question of what really is legally
invalid. See, eg., Fleming, supra note 27, at 374. Ackerman does not, however, appear to be
making such a distinction in this passage.
In a subsequent writing, Ackerman allowed that "dualist theory" might, in the abstract,
allow for absolute entrenchment of a narrow set of political participation rights, but he nevertheless held to his denial that American constitutionalism does so in the concrete. See Ackerman, supra note 13, at 531-33 (apparently maintaining that, according to the American
URR, the Constitution contains no protection of participatory rights against "revocation by
the People" and the People accordingly have the right "to commit suicide by stripping its
members of their participatory rights").
101. Fleming, supra note 27, at 372; see supra text accompanying note 90.
102. Fleming, supra note 27, at 369.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 63-73.
104. The context makes this clear. To begin with, the idea of "structural entrenchment,"
to which Fleming is strongly sympathetic, is itself positivist in the sense of immanentist, so
Fleming's worry cannot be the immanentist spirit of Ackerman's refusal of structural en-
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trasting Ackerman's dogged interpretative resistance to structural
entrenchment with the latter's ardent interpretative reach toward
structural amendment. It is a distinct question whether Ackerman's
embrace of the one is at bottom disconsonant, in method or spirit
or approach, with his rejection of the other.
It is true that Ackerman's negative conclusion about structural
entrenchment roughly matches the conclusion a formal interpretation would reach. By no means, though, does it follow that Ackerman's own conclusion is formalist-inspired, because there is no
reason to expect that formal and nonformal approaches to interpretative questions will usually yield different answers. Should Justice
Scalia ever have occasion to pass on the notional possibility of an
"unconstitutional constitutional amendment," we can imagine him
possibly concluding against that possibility for reasons of interpretative method. It does not follow - rather, it seems unlikely that when Professor Ackerman concludes against that same possibility, he also does so for methodological reasons.
Almost certainly, Ackerman's substantive-side conclusion
comes from the same transtextual, substantive-value premise that
underlies his structural amendment theory, namely, the strong idea
of popular sovereignty that he finds nestled at the heart of the
American URR. This premise directly supports the combined ideas
of the Constitution's openness to higher-law procedural inventiveness (contrary to the apparent formal meaning of Article V) and its
openness to practically limitless change if the People so decree
(consonant with the apparent formal meaning of Article V).105 So
in these terms, too, Ackerman's straddle seems a model of
consistency.
VI. BLOODLESS REVOLUTIONS
There is, however, another sort of seeming inconsistency, harder
to dispel, worth talking about in Ackerman's oeuvre. To help us
spot it clearly, we need to look at some implications of the "positivism" - the immanentism - in which, I have
said, all of the conten10 6
tions of Levinson's interlocutors are set.
One of those interlocutors, David Dow, makes use of a distinction between the "right" and the "power" of someone to change the
Constitution by ways not scripted in Article V.107 Dow is an Article
trenchment. That Fleming meant by "positivism" what we have been calling "formalism" is
supported by Fleming's earlier reference to what he calls the "low-level positivism" that Ackerman ascribes, although Fleming does not himself do so, to the usual run of "lawyers." See
Fleming, supra note 27, at 369.
105. See Fleming, supra note 27, at 372 n.73.
106. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
107. See Dow, supra note 32, at 123.
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V procedural exclusivist and formalist, and this distinction is evidently designed to let him grant the seemingly undeniable - that
someone might succeed in altering drastically the Constitution's
meaning without formal Article V compliance 08 - while continuing to insist that changes thus wrought are not according to law. In
a similar way, Walter Murphy distinguishes the question of whether
or how a people committed to constitutional democracy "can" excise from their constitution the prerequisites of that form of government - guaranteed freedom of political speech, for example 0 9 from the question of whether or how they "may" do so."10
These right-power, may-can usages may seem to stand in a puzzling relation to my claim that all of Levinson's players, Dow and
Murphy included, appear on stage in positivist - immanentist dress."' How can an immanentist-positivist speak of someone having the power but not the right to amend the Constitution in a
certain way - by non-Article-V methods, or in violation of substantive limits? To amend the Constitution is certainly to exert an
effect on what will be recognized as valid law. One might well ask,
then, how Dow or Murphy can speak of anyone having the power
but not the right to do that, while using "right" (as I claim they both
use that term) in the positivistic sense of validity-conferring within
the terms of the regime that is regnant-in-fact.
The question is not unanswerable. What it means to speak in
that way is this: In the event of a change in effective legal content
wrought by power contrary to (positivistic, immanent) right, there
will have occurred not a lawmaking within an extant regime but an
alteration of the regime itself, a revolution in amendment's cloth108. As, for example, Bruce Ackerman contends was lawfully done by a New Deal
"structural amendment." See ACKImAN, supra note 23, at 47-52, 119-20, 195, 268; Bruce
Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE LI. 1013, 1051-57
(1984).
109. The example is not fanciful for those who believe that a "flag-desecration" amendment would be a fateful rollback of constitutionally guaranteed freedom of political speech.
Se e.g., Jeff Rosen, Was the FlagBurningAmendment Unconstitutional?,100 YALE LJ.1073
(1991), described and critically discussed in Vile, supra note 29, at 206-11.

110. See Murphy, supra note 11, at 175. "[P]ower," in Dow's lexicon, is to "right" as
"physics" is to "philosophy - and hence ... law." Dow, supra note 32, at 136. Thus the
term "right" signifies a precondition of legal validity, meaning cognizabaility as valid law, or
as something freighted with whatever special obligatory force (on judicial officers, other officers, citizens at large) we may attribute to law as such. Similarly, Murphy's "can" refers to
"might" as opposed to "right," whereas "may" refers to right itself, or to "validity" or "legitimacy." See Murphy, supra note 11, at 174-75.
111. For the evidence in Murphy's case, see supra note 13. As for Dow, there can be no
doubt that his "right" and his "philosophy" are not that of a natural lawyer but rather that of
a legal positivist - a right and a philosophy observed in an empirical social practice.
Throughout Dow's essay, they are said to be the stuff of "what we [in fact] believe." See
Dow, supra note 32, at 119, 122, 124, 129, 139 n.91; Dow, ConstitutionalMidrash, supra note
46, at 548, 551, 553.
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ing.112 A sufficiently strong majority, sufficiently determined to
conform the Constitution to its will, can undoubtedly do so in ways
that appear to contravene the preexisting URR or "source of legitimacy. '""3 The regnant majority might work its will by purporting to
amend the Constitution explicitly, or it might do so by influencing
judges to find the Constitution already amended "structurally." In
many such instances, Frederick Schauer's preferred account would
be that the real event of legal change occurred in the background
political culture sometime prior to the purported explicit or structural amendment or transformative judicial utterance. For it is
Schauer's contention that "the Constitution necessarily can be
amended by the.., process of amending, socially and politically,
[the] extraconstitutional foundations," the supporting cultural predispositions and presuppositions or URR on which it and its meanings rest. 114 Other writers, such as Dow and Murphy, would
apparently be more inclined to locate the event of legal change at
the point where "power" is focally exercised, presumably the
moment of enactment or recognition of a purported, surface
amendment.
Schauer on the one hand, and Dow and Murphy on the other,
all agree on a positivistic differentiation between the within and the
beyond of an extant regime, where what's within carries ipso facto a
special normative force for the inhabitants and yet the question of
what is within and what beyond rests not with socially transcendent
philosophies of right but with socially immanent facts of belief that
could be other than what they are. Still there may be something
significant at stake in the difference between locating regimechange events in the infra-legal or background culture, as Schauer
would often do, and locating them on the surface of political-institutional action, as Dow and Murphy would more likely do. Regarded as background-cultural events, regime changes would often
or usually appear to be morally indifferent events; they would simply be things that happened in cultures. Regime changes take on a
more obvious moral freight when you regard them as acts of power,
moments of political choice and action. Regime changes are then
always, as a class, morally tainted occasions (although some of them
112. Murphy has made this explicit. See Murphy, supra note 11, at 174-75 (speaking of
"systemic transformation" and "political transmutation"); Murphy, supra note 13, at 757;
RAwLS, supra note 97, at 239; Fleming, supra note 27, at 372.
113. See Fleming, supra note 27, at 372; Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited:
Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1043, 1045 n.1 (1988).
114. See Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions,supra note 3, at 156; see also id. at 148
("Constitutions are .. .subject to amendment as their supporting presuppositions are
amended, even though it cannot be the case that the amendment of those supporting presuppositions can be thought of in anything other than ... prelegal terms."); Dow, Constitutional
Midrash,supra note 46, at 555 nA1 ("to talk of amending certain provisions is to concede that
we are no longer the same culture that we once were").
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might possibly also, all things considered, be morally excused or justified); 115 they are then always occasions of acts in excess of (immanent) right, therefore occasions of presumption, of breach of faith
with the fellowship of the country.
Bruce Ackerman as legal interpreter does not believe the
American Constitution as it is entrenches participatory or any other
human rights. Bruce Ackerman as political philosopher faults our
Constitution in this respect; he holds a "liberal foundationalism" to
be morally preferable to the democratic dualism that is, in fact as he
sees it, the American regime. He says that he would like to see the
regime-fact change from democratic dualist to rights foundationalist, and that he would in principle be willing, if he came to think as he does not now - that the need for such an effort outweighed
its dangers, to work at rebuild[ing] our political language and practice from its very foundations."'1 16 He would in any case have
Americans "self-consciously amend our constitution" so as to
"make it clear that democracy is not our ultimate constitutional
value, that human dignity and social justice come first."' 1 7
Is there any sense, any degree, in which it could be held wrong,
even by a philosophically committed rights-foundationalist such as
Ackerman himself, for Ackerman and other Americans to undertake such a course of radically transforming what they themselves
hold to be the extant democratic-dualist foundations of America?
Maybe so: How can one in good faith approach a People of allegedly democratic-dualist "political identity"" 8 with the proposition
of throwing overboard their democratic-dualist regime in favor of
an opposite, alien, rights-foundationalist kind? How can one coherently urge that People "self-consciously" to go ahead and "make
clear" what must be false for them as long as they remain themselves: that they place justice ahead of democracy?
Consider, then, Schauer's view. Perhaps it can alleviate the difficulty. If it is correct, then no one need "self-consciously amend"
the Constitution in order to make rights foundationalism the new
American way. It would suffice to reshape the political background
culture to the point where it simply was true that structural entrenchment had come in from the cold and become a part of the
American URR. Would it be in all respects morally permitted or would it, to the contrary, be in any respect morally prohibited to attempt fomentation of such an infra-legal revolution by going to
115. See Kent Greenawalt, Dualism and Its Status, 104 ETmcs 480, 484 (1994) (speaking
of attempts at constitutional change that might be morally justified even though ultra-legal).
116. Ackerman, supra note 13, at 535.
117. Id. at 533.

118. See ACYKERMAN, supra note 23, at 204 (discussing the potential for revolutionary
changes in "political identity").
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work deliberately on the background culture (as a radio talk show
host, maybe)?
If prohibited, by what value or principle, if not the true moral
superiority (which Ackerman rejects) of the way of unqualified
popular sovereignty? If permitted, on the other hand, why hesitate
from the effort? It is hard to see that it need be dangerous. What
need one risk, other than loss in the United States of the sense of
unqualified popular sovereignty itself, along with whatever moral
value that carries (which by Ackerman's philosophical reckoning is
less than the moral value carried by the way of rights foundationalism)? If these are fair questions, they point toward a residual hesitation on Ackerman's part to make rights precede democracy, even
in philosophy. Or perhaps what they point to is a hesitation to
make philosophy prior to democracy, or to citizenship. I do not say
this hesitation is a fault.119
VII. THi THREAT OF INTERPRETATION
One so minded can make out an architectonic design in Responding to Imperfection. All told, the book contains thirteen chapters by thirteen authors - Levinson wrote two chapters, while
Holmes and Sunstein co-authored one. The exact middle is Chapter Seven, but let that pass for a moment. On each side of it, we
find a cluster of three chapters, each composing an interpretative
debate about the exclusivity of Article V. In Chapters Four
through Six, Professors Ackerman, Amar, and Dow contend over
procedural exclusivity. In Chapters Eight through Ten, Professors
Murphy, Vile, and Brandon - and also indirectly, through Brandon's accounts of their views, Professors Barber and Harris - contend over substantive exclusivity.
These two debate clusters make up the book's foreground action, its ostensible main events. Their spirit and content are dominantly and unmistakably prescriptive or "normative. '120 That is,
they work at persuading us toward the authors' own conclusions
about how we as citizens ought to conceive of the business of ordering our constitutional-legal affairs, how we ought and ought not
practically to go about that business and permit our public office119. See generally John Rawls, Reply to Habermos, 92 J. Pmint 132, 140-41 (1995) ("[A]
philosopher has no more authority than other citizens."); id. at 159-61 (denying that in his
political philosophy, the "liberties of the modems," or "natural law," impose "restrictions on
the people's constituent will"); Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 Pot. THEoRY
379 (1981) (putting democracy first, at least in politics). But see Michael J. Klarman, ConstitutionalFact/ConstitutionalFiction: A Critiqueof Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional
Moments, 44 STAN. L. Ray. 759, 763 n.37 (1992) (book review) (characterizing the split between Ackerman's philosophical rights foundationalism and his legal democratic dualism as a
"glaring contradiction" that argues against taking his legal exegesis seriously).
120. See, eg., Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. Rnv. 167, 177
(1990).
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holders to go about it, and how we ought to respond to claims (or
denials) of re-orderings coming from officeholders or other citizens.
Smack in the middle of the book, right between the two threechapter clusters of normative debate, stands Chapter Seven, in
which Frederick Schauer proposes that constitutions change when
their culturally embedded attitudinal and perceptual underpinnings
change beneath them. Schauer's chapter is descriptive and analytic,
not prescriptive; it offers a view about how things work, not about
what is to be done or not done. The same is largely true of the
book's chapters that flank the prescriptive debates on their outer
sides. 121 In Chapters Two and Three, Levinson' 22 and Stephen M.
Griffin' 23 raise and press a descriptive point, distinct from
Schauer's, about the possibly modest role of official "amendment"
events in the real-life history of change in constitutional-legal
meanings, and the point they raise is echoed on the other flank, in
Chapters Eleven through Thirteen, by Donald S. Lutz, 24 Stephen
Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein,'2 and Noam J. Zohar. 126
For Schauer, the interesting alternative mode of constitutional
change is subterranean shift in the cultural ground. For Levinson
and Griffin, by contrast, the interesting alternative mode is surfacetextual, not infra-textual. It consists of official interpretations of
the expressly given text, whether done explicitly by judges deciding
cases (Levinson), or implicitly by legislative and executive officeholders enacting and enforcing statutes (Griffin), in either case with
the kind of eventual acceptance from the other branches and the
public that turns the interpreted meaning into effective law. The
same descriptive point recurs dramatically at the book's end, where
Zohar describes how midrashic commentary achieves - and not
only achieves but celebrates as divinely intended - radical alteration by human work of the evident meaning of a divinely revealed
legal text. 27
121. Here we disregard chapter 1, Levinson's general introduction. Levinson, supranote
28.
122. Sanford Levinson, How Many Tunes Has the United States Constitution Been
Amended? (A) < 26; (B) 26; (C) 27 (D) > 27: Accounting for Constitutional Change, in
IMPERFECTION 13.

123. See Griffin, supra note 17.

124. Lutz, supra note 2.
125. Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 2.
126. Zohar, supra note 2.
127. The point recurs less dramatically when Lutz and Holmes-Sunstein remind us of the
equilibrium or trade-off relations among various routes to constitutional-legal change. These
routes include "amendment" schemata made more or less procedurally demanding to ensure
broad and deep popular backing for an enacted change, activist judicial interpretation of
enacted constitutional texts, and a wide berth to ordinary lawmakers to change constitutional-legal meanings, either by interpretation or by textual revision using relatively easy
procedures. See Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 279, 295, 300-01; Lutz, supra note 2, at
245-46.
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Are Levinson and Griffin to be understood, then, as lending
support to the prescriptive claims of Ackerman and Amar for the
virtues and benefits of amendment procedures outside of Article
V? That is not how they speak in these pages. Neither Levinson
nor Griffin makes any claim here that the People's voice is heard or
represented in nearly every instance of effective constitutional
change wrought by officials' interpretative initiatives. More generally, Levinson's and Griffin's nonexciusivisms are descriptively, not
prescriptively, presented; they speak of what happens, not of what
ought to happen.
So what we have, in sum, is this: at the book's exact center, a
descriptive-analytical proposition - call it "realist" - about how
higher legal meaning can change out of sight of official higher lawmaking; surrounding this, as what appear to be the book's featured
events, twin clusters of normative-interpretative debate about how
we are meant to go about official higher lawmaking, proceeding
without reference to the realist proposition; and as prelude and
postlude to those clusters, chapters raising and reraising another
troublesome descriptive-analytic point that the normative debaters
keep mainly out of sight. 'This structure cannot be accidental.
Let us return to the normative debates. Although they do not
and cannot stay clear of methodological and analytical issues - of
interpretative method and the sources of law - we have seen how
they turn mainly on ideas about the substantive values that a constitutionalist or higher-law system is meant to serve. The responses
they make to interpretative questions about the procedural and
substantive exclusivity of Article V are suffused with differing views
about the primarily intended good of a dualist legal structure. Is it
justice, ensuring that those who govern on a daily basis do so in a
manner consistent with human rights? Is it democracy, ensuring
that the People, who cannot remain in constant session, have the
ultimate word regarding the basic terms on which they live together
in a legally ordered world? That, for the most part, is the choice we
are given. 1 8
What we have before us, then, are prescriptive debates over
constitutional amendment rules, 129 responding to regulative ideas
of justice and democracy. Debates of this character rest on certain
epistemological and sociological presuppositions. The necessary
epistemological premises - regarding what inhabitants of a constitutional system are capable of knowing or discerning - would
128. We need not, for present purposes, resolve whether ideals of justice and democracy
are or are not best conceived as standing in any degree in a relation of polar opposition.
Nothing in what follows depends on whether these are conceived as two separate ideals or as
two facets of one ideal.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
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seem to be at least two in number. The first is that we can securely
distinguish events on the level of "routine legal change," occurring
by processes and within bounds set by extant higher law, from
events on the level of change in the higher law itself.130 If we could
not, we could never know that the dictates ensconced in the higher
law were really ruling over the daily affairs of government. So
whether these are regarded as dictates of the People or of justice,
we could never know that our dualist practice was serving its supposed ideal objective.
This first epistemic requirement of normative dualism may not
seem terribly threatening by itself. It simply restates, after all, in a
general form, the question of "constitutionality" (of some piece of
ordinary-governmental activity) that we deal with all the time in the
practice and teaching of constitutional law. But the first epistemic
requirement leads to the second, and the second seems to pose a
clear and present danger to the normative amendment-rule project.
The second epistemic presupposition of the normative debates
is that we can, at the higher-legal level, distinguish an innovation or
change in the law from an interpretation or re-interpretation of existing law, law that is not itself thereby made or changed. 131 The
normative debates all take it that amendment rules matter because
of their bearing on how closely the legislative product issuing from
them - the higher law - approximates the true dictates of justice
or the People, it being the whole point of a dualist system to ensure
that dictates from these sources effectively constrain everyday government. The debates, then, are so much whistling in the wind unless the express higher legislative product that issues from the
amendment rules whatever they be - the higher law containing
those dictates - is securely demarcated from interpretations of it
at the point of concrete application. Dictates of justice or the People may well leave some room for interpretative applicational variance. But unless the law remains a clearly visible constant beneath
its interpretative overlay, the dualist project (as we have thus far
conceived it) is defeated.
The sociological presupposition of the normative amendmentrule project is somewhat similarly derived. It is that we can be confident that higher legal content remains unchanged as long as there
is no express change in the visible surface law or its interpretation.
The more fully and truly it were the case that higher-legal meaning
undergoes alteration by nonvisible, nonregulable processes such as
cultural shift or drift, the less point there would be in pretending
either that we are ruled by dictates of justice or the People con130. Cf. Zohar, supra note 2, at 307, 315-16.
131. Cf. id. at 205-06.
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tained in express higher-law formulations or, therefore, that the exact shape of our official amendment rules matters very much.
Here, then, would be one way of understanding and explaining
the arrangement of the chapters in Responding to Imperfection: On
the wings and at upstage center, we see the presuppositions of the
foregrounded normative amendment-rule debates under serious attack. Schauer at the center rear is cutting ground from under the
sociological presupposition, while Levinson and Griffin on one
wing and Lutz and Zohar on the other are, in their different ways,
casting doubt on the second, crucial epistemic presupposition.
A part of Griffin's message, reinforced by Lutz and HolmesSunstein as already described' 32, is that pressure to maintain the
semblance of a transpolitical higher law - a higher law that regulates rather than reflects ordinary politics - forces needed major
constitutional change into the mold of on-going implicit interpretation by government officeholders. 3 3 Levinson simultaneously contends that we lack and can never obtain the means by which to
demonstrate that a given ruling or other action, taken in the higher
law's name, is "really" interpretation as opposed to innovation.
Much as we need the amendment-interpretation distinction, he
says, we cannot have it. It is a "nested opposition,"'' a "basic notion[ ] that structure[s] our thought even as [it is] constantly subject
to conceptual revision and 'deconstructive' analysis.'1363 5 Zohar's
message, whether or not intended, is much the same.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

It does not follow, nor do I believe Levinson is trying to tell us,
37
that normative amendment-rule debates are aimlessly delusive.
From that inference there seem to be at least two routes of escape.
One is to posit a point or objective for dualist constitutionalism that
doesn't depend on higher-legal meanings not changing subterraneanly, or on them not changing in the guise of interpretation from
which the law "itself" cannot be securely distinguished. For example, the point might simply be to do what we can to protect ourselves against utterly unrestrained, capricious, or despotic
132. See supra text accompanying notes 123-25.
133. See Griffin, supra note 17, at 42-43.
134. Levinson supra note 2, at 33 (quoting J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions,99 YALE L.J.

1669 (1990)).
135. Id.

136. See supra text accompanying note 127.
137. It is clear not only from his contributions to this volume, but also from some of his
other work, that Levinson takes the normative debates very seriously. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of the Amending Clause (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the author).

May 1995]

Thirteen Easy Pieces

1331

government 38 (without, that is, insisting that the constraints coincide with express dictates of moral reason or of the People). Maintaining the sociopolitical forms of dualist constitutionalism might
well serve that objective, regardless of whether higher-law meanings are or can be secured against infiltrations from either muscular
interpreters or the background political culture. If so, then how
well the objective is served could well
depend, in part, on an apt
choice of express amendment rules. 139
The same holds for a society's conceivable objective, attributed
by some to constitutionalist practice, to commit the governable aspects of its life to the governance of the word, "to constitute itself
politically by reference to a text.' 140 While such an undertaking
doubtless requires that attributions of constitutional-legal meanings
satisfy, from occasion to occasion, certain experiential demands of
comprehensibility and coherence, 141 there is no reason why this satisfaction cannot - indeed, there seems every reason why it would
have to - rest in part on a correspondence, achieved in part by
interpretation, of law with prelegal form-of-life. 142 An express
amendment rule would doubtless be required to sustain such a venture in living-by-logos, and it could be more or less aptly designed
143
to lead to better coherence.
Levinson's collection supplies us with these possible ways to salvage normative concern with amendment rules from the critiques
coming from the wings and center background of his conversational
stage. Yet I.
don't take them to be his way. His, I gather, is more
quizzical and relaxed, and at the same time more unabashedly attached to the classical substantive constitutionalist values of justice
and democracy. It is, simply, that we live by ideals and, concomitantly, make do with counterfactuals. Does a justice-and-democracy driven constitutionalist ideal presuppose a perceptual ability
(to tell apart amendments and interpretations) that we cannot
have? So be it:
[R]egardless of our inability to provide an allegedly firm, and formalistic, conceptual grounding of our terms, we nonetheless find that we
make our way through the world - or more accurately, through the
138. See eg., Griffin, supra note 17, at 39.
139. This may pretty closely describe the view of Holmes and Sunstein. See Holmes &
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 304.
140. Brandon, supra note 5, at 226 (describing the view of 'WilliamHarris II); id. at 229
(asserting the same in his own voice).
141. See id. at 230-31.
142. See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REv. 781,799800, 808-09, 817 (1989).
143. Cf.Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist,63 S. CAT_ L.REv. 1699,
1710-11 (1990) (discussing "bad coherence").

1332

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:1297

forms of life that make up our worlds - by recurrence to basic notions that we simply seem unable to leave behind.144
Of course, that is only my reading, my interpretation. But what
else did you have any immanent right to expect?

144. Levinson, supra note 122, at 33.

